Ep 92: Soviet Union (Part 3)
- Matt Crumpton
- 2 hours ago
- 15 min read
We’re in the middle of trying to answer the question of whether the Soviet Union played a role in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. So, far, we’ve gotten context into the relationship between the Americans and Soviets, and Kennedy and Khruschev, in particular – exploring Vienna, Berlin and the incident at Checkpoint Charlie, and the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In this episode, we focus our analysis on whether Cold War spy games had any connection to the assassination of President Kennedy, or to his accused assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald. What did a high ranking KGB mole within the CIA have to do with Oswald? Was Yuri Nosenko, who downplayed Soviet interest in Oswald, really a bona fide defector? And, after all these years, do we know the identity of the KGB mole today?
PYOTR POPOV
In Vienna, Austria in 1952, Soviet Military Intelligence Colonel, Pyotr Popov, dropped a note into an American diplomat’s car offering to trade information for money. During Popov’s first meeting with the Americans, he said he had been drinking too much and QUOTE “got rolled by a bar girl” who took all of his money. Some of that money was official funds, that he had to replace, or he would be court-martialed.[1] After trading an organizational chart for the Soviet armored division for the equivalent of about $125 American dollars, Colonel Popov had become a defector in place to the Central Intelligence Agency.[2]
For about three years, Popov provided valuable information to his CIA handler, George Kisevalter, including technical information about Soviet guided missiles and nuclear submarines. But, when Popov was recalled to Moscow, the CIA thought it was too risky to continue contact with him, and they lost their mole for a period of time, despite efforts to contact him in Moscow.[3]
In 1956, Popov was sent on duty to Scwherin, East Germany. In an overzealous effort to get back in contact with the Americans, Popov tried to give a message to the CIA through a British military officer that he saw in a restaurant in Schwerin. When one of the officers went to the restroom, Popov followed him in, gave him an envelope, and told him to give it to Kisevalter, his handler, at the Berlin CIA station.
The officer Popov interacted with at the restaurant then passed the information to the CIA’s British counterpart, MI-6, who reviewed the envelope before passing it on to the Americans. Unbeknownst to Popov, one of the MI-6 agents who became aware of Popov’s bathroom information exchange was George Blake – who would later be revealed to be a KGB mole within MI-6. Blake then told the KGB that there was a GRU Soviet Military Intelligence mole in East Germany, but he didn’t know the officer’s name.[4]
POPOV GETS BUSTED
In January of 1957, the chief of KGB operations against the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, Vladyslav Kovshuk, visited the Soviet Embassy in Washington. During that trip, Kovshuk found out about Popov’s defection in place to the CIA from the KGB’s own mole who had penetrated high levels within the CIA.[5] That’s right, there was a KGB mole within the CIA, just like there was a CIA mole within the GRU. The difference was that the KGB now knew about Popov. But, the CIA still didn’t know the identity of its mole.
In November of 1958, Popov was told to return from East Germany to hand deliver a file to Moscow about an American student who Popov helped recruit to pad his recruitment numbers, with the help of his CIA handlers. As soon as he arrived in Moscow, Popov was arrested. The KGB who now had Popov under control, then used him as a triple agent against the CIA in Moscow for several months, until, eventually, Popov was found guilty of treason and executed by a firing squad in June of 1960.[6]
The information that Popov provided to the CIA saved the U.S. half a billion dollars in military research. But, most importantly, in April of 1958, before he had been co-opted by the Soviets, Popov warned the CIA about an active KGB mole inside the agency who had passed on technical details to the Soviets about the CIA’s secret U-2 spy plane. Popov had overheard this claim of a KGB mole in the CIA from a drunk GRU Colonel.[7]This elusive Soviet spy, for whom counterintelligence chief, James Angleton, was desperately hunting, came to be known, as Popov’s Mole.
OSWALD’S ROLE
As we already covered in Season 2, when Oswald left the Marines in a hurry, he did so based on a lie about needing to help his mother. There were also other clues that the official story was not true, like Oswald’s fellow marine, David Bucknell, saying he had personal knowledge Oswald was selected to participate in an intelligence operation, and that Oswald told him in 1959, not long before he left the Marines, that he would soon be discharged and would be on assignment in the Soviet Union.[8]
So, what other evidence is there to show that Oswald, the U2 radar operator, was a false defector? First, there is the routing of Oswald’s file within the CIA. Normally, all incoming messages about a Soviet defector would go to the Soviet Russia Division. But, in Oswald’s case, his files were sent to the Office of Security instead.[9]According to Professor John Newman, the reason Oswald’s files were handled differently is because he was being used as bait, or flypaper as Newman calls it, to try to get Popov’s Mole to out himself.[10]
The idea was that Oswald would go to the Soviet Union and put on a show in the American Embassy about how he had U2 information and was willing to share it with the Soviets. The audience for this performance, was the KGB who, as the Americans were aware, had the American Embassy in Moscow under surveillance. Then, when the KGB heard about Oswald’s offer to provide information, they would contact their mole at the CIA to confirm whether Oswald was a bona fide defector or just an American provocation. But, because Oswald’s files were held in the Office of Security (and not the Soviet Russia Division), whenever anyone asked for access to the file, the CIA would have a potential Soviet mole to investigate. But, in Oswald’s case, no one ever asked any questions about him to the Office of Security and the plan stalled out. More on why momentarily.
Still, the existence of this mole hunt using Oswald can be seen in the history of how his file was handled with the Agency. In order for all of Oswald’s files to be routed to the Office of Security (instead of the Soviet Russia Division where they should have gone), someone had to set up the diverted file routing with the office of Mail Logistics and Records Integration Division in advance.[11]
And remember, Jane Roman, the senior liaison officer on the CIA’s Counterintelligence Staff, who personally handled Oswald’s file, told Professor Newman and Jefferson Morley in 1994 that Oswald’s file was QUOTE “held very closely on a need to know basis.”[12] There is no plausible reason to have this level of interest in Oswald – and to ignore all of the normal rules of CIA file routing – unless Oswald was working with or for the CIA in some capacity. The CIA has never explained why Oswald’s file was routed in this way.
In 2012, esteemed JFK Assassination researcher Malcolm Blunt met with legendary CIA Counterintelligence spy, Pete Bagley, at his home in Brussels to ask for Bagley’s opinion about documents related to Oswald’s time in the Soviet Union. Looking at those documents, and in particular the routing of the documents, Bagley confidently told Blunt that Oswald QUOTE “had to be” a witting false defector.[13] This is consistent with what FBI Liaison to the CIA, Sam Papich told the Church Committee. He said that he remembered there were QUOTE “discussions of a plan to have a CIA or FBI man defect to Moscow.”[14]
Golitysn & Philby
On December 15, 1961, KGB Major, Anatoliy Golitsyn, defected to the CIA from his post as vice-consul at the Soviet Embassy in Helsinki, Finland. Shortly after his arrival in the United States, Golitsyn was interviewed by James Angleton, with whom he would eventually become close, once he had established his bona fides and proven that he was a legitimate defector.[15] Most importantly, Golitsyn’s defection led to the discovery that the head of counterespionage operations for Britain’s MI-6, Kim Philby, was himself a Soviet mole.[16]
Philby had become friends with Angleton during his OSS days in London while they were fighting World War II. Angleton was initially suspicious of Philby during the war due to a few incidents where Philby failed to provide information when he should have.[17] Still, Philby would later gain Angleton’s trust and the two men worked together regularly.[18]
Philby’s placement at the top of British intelligence, meant that every time the Americans shared something with the Brits, which was often, the Soviets knew about it. Philby ultimately got away with it, defecting to the Soviet Union and becoming a national hero there in 1963.[19]
Another area where Anatoliy Golitsyn was helpful to the CIA was in distinguishing the difference between genuine and false Soviet defectors.[20] Golitsyn’s skill set would end up being called on when it came to decoding the riddle of Yuri Nosenko.
Yuri Nosenko
On February 4, 1964, about two and a half months after President Kennedy was assassinated, KGB Officer, Yuri Nosenko defected to the CIA in Geneva, Switzerland. Nosenko’s defection was handled by none other than CIA counterintelligence officer, Pete Bagley. As you can imagine, the CIA was paranoid about false defectors from the KGB who were providing false information, in hopes that the Americans would rely on it. Yuri Nosenko was no exception to this paranoia.[21] Nosenko said that there was no KGB mole in the CIA. Golitsyn, the earlier KGB defector who was determined to be legit, said that Nosenko was lying about that.[22]
Starting in April of 1964, Nosenko was confined and interrogated in safe house in Clinton, Maryland until mid-August 1965, when Nosenko was moved to a specially constructed jail just for him in a remote wooded area.[23] The Soviet Russia division of the CIA was convinced that Nosenko was an agent sent from the KGB under false pretenses, but they were unable to prove it or get Nosenko to confess.[24] Nosenko stayed in that jail under constant interrogation until October of 1967.[25]
The reason why Nosenko is relevant to the JFK Assassination is that he claimed that he supervised the KGB file on Lee Harvey Oswald,[26] and that he was responsible for compromising Americans who were visiting Moscow, which, if true, would mean that Oswald was under Nosenko’s jurisdiction when he visited Moscow in 1959.[27] Nosenko said that he researched the question of whether there was ever any relationship between the KGB and Oswald, after Kennedy’s assassination. He claimed that, while Soviet intelligence did surveil Oswald, it viewed him as mentally unfit, and never debriefed him or had any relationship with him. As Gerald Posner puts it, QUOTE “If that was true, it meant that the KGB and the Soviet Union were absolved of complicity in JFK’s murder.”[28]
So, was Nosenko a genuine defector who could be trusted about his Oswald claims, or was he a liar, who was sent by the Soviets to deceive?
Nosenko Legit?
When Richard Helms became the director of the CIA he was undecided about Nosenko’s bona fides, but he knew that the matter had to be resolved. Helms assigned the CIA’s Bruce Solie to be responsible for a complete review of Nosenko. According to Gerald Posner, Solie, who trusted Nosenko, was QUOTE “a 16 year veteran and the Agency’s most experienced spycatcher.”[29] On the other hand, James Angleton, the counterintelligence chief, and Pete Bagley, a KGB expert for the CIA who was the one who processed Nosenko’s defection, were certain that Nosenko was a Soviet plant.[30]
In a comfortable Washington, D.C. safehouse, Nosenko was interviewed under friendly conditions by Bruce Solie for more than a year. Aside from Solie’s casual talks with Nosenko, there was other evidence to support that Nosenko was a real defector. He gave six solid leads about Soviet spies penetrating Eurpoean allies, which resulted in some of those spies actually being arrested. After these arrests, Angleton continued to doubt Nosenko, responding that he had just given up low level assets that were disposable.[31]
In September of 1968, after Nosenko passed a polygraph test, Bruce Solie submitted his final report concluding that Nosenko was a bona fide defector. In March of 1969, Director Helms hired Nosenko as a KGB consultant, compensated him for his imprisonment, and provided Nosenko with a new name and a clean slate.[32] As of today, the official policy of the CIA remains that Nosenko was a genuine defector. In 1992, Author Gerald Posner interviewed Nosenko, who one would think must have been hard to find with a new identity. Nosenko confirmed to Posner that the KGB had no interest in Oswald.[33]
Nosenko Exposed
So, why were Bagley and Angleton so sure that Nosenko was a false defector?
First, Nosenko was supposedly in Geneva, Switzerland providing security for the Soviet delegation to a conference there, but he had no fixed duties or requirements. He also said that he was not staying with the rest of the delegation. As he was processing Nosenko, Bagley knew it was against KGB protocol for officers to stay at a different hotel from the delegation they were supposed to be securing. The only person who knew where Nosenko spent his time was his friend, Yuri Guk, who worked at the Soviet Intelligence station in Geneva. Nosenko told Bagley that his roommate at the hotel was Aleksandr Kislov, who was QUOTE “a journalist who had nothing to do with the KGB.”[34]
Neither of the two men who Nosenko mentioned to Pete Bagley during that first meeting had the jobs that Nosenko said they did. Both Yuri Guk and Aleksandr Kislov worked for the deception department of the Second Chief Directorate of the KGB. The deception department was responsible for launching deceptions against the CIA – quite a coincidence when Nosenko is alleged to be deceiving the CIA in exactly that type of operation.[35]
Perhaps the most alarming fact about Nosenko came from FBI documents that Bagley reviewed about a 1957 trip to Washington by Vladislav Kovshuk, the chief of operations against the American Embassy in Moscow,[36] who was traveling under a false name and frequently attending movie theaters throughout the Washington area. The FBI never caught Kovshuk in the act of meeting with any American officials at these theaters. But, the reports captured the names of the two men who were traveling with Kovshuk – Yuri Guk and Aleksandr Kislov. The same two men who Nosenko mentioned to Bagley after he had a few drinks that first meeting, as having nothing important to do with Soviet intelligence, also went to America together, and loitered around movie theaters, ostensibly looking to make contact with an American spy.[37]
Kondrashev
But, this fact apparently did not phase the Central Intelligence Agency. The chapter of American History on Yuri Nosenko was almost closed, with a conclusion that Nosenko was legit – and that he must have been telling the truth that Oswald was QUOTE “not considered to be an interesting target” by Soviet Intelligence.[38]But, a meeting in 1994 between Pete Bagley and former KGB chief,[39] Sergey Kondrashev, would bring new information to light and conclusively establish that Yuri Nosenko was a false defector who had been sent to deceive the Americans by the KGB.
Bagley and Kondrashev, who were fierce rivals during the Cold War, struck up a friendship after meeting at a reunion of Cold War Intelligence Officers from both sides. At this first meeting, Bagley asked why Kovshuk went to Washington in 1957 with Yuri Guk and Aleksandr Kislov in the first place? Kondrashev responded “Oh, that was to meet an important agent. One who was never uncovered.”[40]
During Nosenko’s first meeting with Bagley, he mentioned that his boss, Vladislav Kovshuk, was sent to the United States to try to reactivate an American spy named Andrey after the KGB lost contact. In the second meeting, Nosenko played down the importance of Andrey. It turned out that, there was an Andrey, who was a low level cipher machine mechanic that was recruited in Moscow when working for the American embassy. But, the real reason for Kovshuk’s trip to the US, according to the former head of the KGB – was to meet with Popov’s mole in the CIA, who was never discovered. And when Kovshuk (who was Nosenko’s boss) came looking for Popov’s mole in 1957, he did it with the help of the two men Yuri Nosenko was hanging out with when he defected – Yuri Guk and Aleksandr Kislov.
Regarding Nosenko, Kondrashev confirmed that he was not genuine, saying QUOTE “How could your service ever have believed in that man?”[41]
Soviet Intelligence Interest in Oswald
Nosenko had claimed that the Soviets merely surveilled Oswald, but were not interested in him. However, declassified documents now make it clear that Oswald was of interest to the Soviets.
On November 4, 1959, a few days after his dramatic performance at the American Embassy, Oswald spoke to the KGB about QUOTE “the subject of possible use abroad.”[42] According to KGB Colonel, Oleg Nechiporenko, Oswald said during this meeting that he was willing to share secrets with the Soviets, which placed Oswald in the most serious category – espionage.[43]
In 1991, we learned during an episode of ABC News Nightline with Ted Koppel, that the Soviets intercepted Oswald’s first letter to the American Embassy in 1960. ABC News claimed to have seen the letter in Oswald’s KGB files. So, we know that the KGB at least cared enough about Oswald to steal his mail.[44]
Finally, there is some evidence that Oswald was even more involved with Soviet Intelligence than previously known. In 1981, KGB officer, Sergei Papushin, defected in place to the CIA while still working for the KGB.[45]Papushin, who had an affinity for alcohol was given the codename, IJ Decanter, which was exposed by journalist James Risen in 1997.[46]
According to what Papushin later told the CIA, a former Colonel Yurshak, who he reported to in the KGB, told him that Marina Oswald was a swallow, who was directed by the local KGB branch in Minsk to sleep with Oswald. As far as Oswald himself, he was not a KGB agent, but the local branch had a file on Oswald and considered him a KGB agent to pad their numbers. Oswald never had any involvement with the KGB once back in the United States. And Marina refused to cooperate with the Soviets when she left for America with Oswald, seeking a better life.[47]
Bruce Solie
We just talked about how Bruce Solie was centrally involved in determining whether or not Yuri Nosenko was a bona fide defector. As noted, we now have evidence that Nosenko was a Soviet provocation all along. When we zoom in on Bruce Solie, the reason for his pro-Nosenko leanings becomes clear.
It was Bruce Solie’s job, as the chief of the Office of Security’s Research Branch to lead the day to day search for Popov’s mole.[48] While Pete Bagley was never able to determine the identity of Popov’s Mole, Professor John Newman alleges that the mole was the man who set up the mole hunt - Bruce Solie. This would explain Solie’s insistence on focusing the mole hunt on the Soviet Russia Division only. And, it would explain why Solie could never find the elusive mole. According to Newman, it was Solie the whole time!
Newman believes Solie was Popov’s Mole for a few reasons. First, we know the mole had to be very high within the CIA and Solie fits that description. Second, KGB officer, Vladislav Kovshuk, went to Washington to meet with Popov’s Mole in January 1957, which was where Solie lived. Third, Solie traveled to Zurich, Switzerland immediately after Kovshuk’s visit to the US in February 1957. Fourth, Solie lied to both FBI liaison Sam Papish and to the CIA’s Jane Roman when they asked about Oswald. For example, when Papish asked about Oswald he was told there was QUOTE “no info on subject.” Solie then documented “oral FBI name check request” in Oswald’s file, which Solie had just told Papish did not exist.[49]
Finally, fifth, and most convincing for Newman, Solie traveled to Paris in May of 1962 and then again in June of 1962. The May trip is not explained. There is no claim that he was on vacation. There is no CIA explanation for why Solie was in Paris in May. We know from French intelligence that a senior KGB officer, Mikhail Tsymbal, was present in Paris in May of 1962 at the same time Solie was there. If you are interested in even more arguments that Newman makes against Bruce Solie, you can read about them in his book, Uncovering Popov’s Mole.
NEXT TIME ON SOLVING JFK: We wrap up our series on the Soviet Union by addressing arguments raised by former CIA director James Woolsey that Lee Harvey Oswald acted on behalf of the Soviets and killed President Kennedy without anyone else’s help.
[1] John M. Newman, Into the Storm: The Assassination of President Kennedy, Volume III, at 202.
[2] Id. at 200-202.
[3] Id. at 206-207.
[4] Id. at 209.
[5] Id. at 200.
[6] Id. at 216-217.
[7] Id. at 200-201, 210.
[9] John M. Newman, Uncovering Popov’s Mole, at 47-48.
[10] Id. at 46-51.
[11] Id. at 47.
[13] Newman, Uncovering Popov’s Mole, at 41.
[14] Id. at 42.
[16] Newman, Into the Storm, at 222.
[18] Newman, Into the Storm, at 326-327.
[20] Newman, Into the Storm, at 223. (Upon arriving at the CIA, Golitsyn said that the KGB discovered the treason of Pyotr Popov in 1957. Significantly, this led the CIA’s Pete Bagley, to the conclusion that Vladislav Kovshuk’s 1957 visit to Washington was the exact moment when the Popov defection was relayed to the Soviets from the KGB’s still undiscovered mole within the CIA.)
[22] Gerald Posner, Case Closed, at 37.
[23] Id. at 40.
[25] Id.
[26] Id.
[27] Posner, at 35.
[28] Id. at 35.
[29] Id. at 43.
[30] Id. at 43. They backed up their claims with a 900 page report.
[31] Id.
[32] Id. at 44.
[33] Id. at 48-49.
[34] Newman, Into the Storm, at 320-321.
[35] Id. at 318.
[36] Id. at 200.
[37] Id. at 328.
[39] Newman, Into the Storm, at 339.
[40] Id. at 338.
[41] Id. at 340.
[42] Oleg Nechiporenko, Passport to Assassination, at 32-34, 43.
[43] Id.
[44] 11/22/91, Journal Graphics, Transcription of ABC News Nightline #2740, “An ABC News Nightline Investigation: The KGB Oswald Files.”; https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Y7Dou0rgC48
[45] Newman, Uncovering Popov’s Mole, at 63-64.
[48] Newman, Uncovering Popov’s Mole, at 45.
[49] Id. at 48-49.




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