Episode 91 – Soviet Union (Part 2)

The Cuban Missile Crisis is the closest that the United States and Soviet Union ever came to an all-out nuclear war. After Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev sent nuclear weapons into Cuba in an effort to gain strategic leverage on the Cold War chessboard, the United States was almost provoked into a military confrontation with the Soviets that could have easily gone nuclear.

In this episode, we analyze the Cuban Missile Crisis. How did it get started? What exactly was at stake? And, most importantly for our purposes, is there anything that the Cuban Missile Crisis can teach us about the assassination of President Kennedy?

Soviet Logic

Ever since the Bay of Pigs invasion in April of 1961, Nikita Khrushchev believed that the U.S. was going to invade Cuba and topple its new communist leader, Fidel Castro.^[1] It was just a matter of when. As a response to this fear, and to the proximity of American nuclear weapons in the United Kingdom, Italy, and Turkey to Moscow, Khruschev decided to put nuclear missiles in Cuba.^[2]  

At the end of May 1962, a small Soviet delegation visited with Castro and a few of his advisors, and Castro approved of Khrushchev's plan. In the Summer and Fall of 1962, the USSR sent 60 ballistic missiles and 42,000 Soviet troops more than 7,000 miles across the ocean to Cuba.^[3]

On July 30th, Khrushchev asked Kennedy to stop reconnaissance flights over Soviet ships in the Caribbean QUOTE “for the sake of better relations.” Kennedy agreed, so long as Khruschev didn’t take any action towards Berlin. JFK was looking to build some good will and was eager to avoid a crisis with the Soviets too close to the November election.^[4] Khrushchev responded that he would not take any action on Berlin – at least not until the election was over.^[5] The lack of American eyes over Soviet ships made it easier to not tip off the massive operation that was going on in Cuba.

Internal Enemies

On August 31, 1962 undercover GRU agent, and crucial backchannel messenger, Georgi Bolshakov, was getting ready to fly back to Moscow the next day, when he got a call from his friend, attorney general, Robert Kennedy. Bobby asked Bolshakov to meet him to say goodbye before he left for vacation. When Bolshakov arrived at the attorney general’s office, he was told that President Kennedy was waiting for him at the White House and had a message for him to deliver to Khrushchev.^[6]

The president told Bolshakov that he thought the outlook for American-Soviet relations was good. He wanted Khruschev to know that he ordered a stop to American planes doing low flyovers on ships from the Soviet Union bound for Cuba – just like Khrushchev requested. He then asked Bolshakov to pass his message along, and wished him safe travels. But, after the meeting, Bobby Kennedy had much more to say. According to Bolshakov, RFK said QUOTE:

Goddamn it, Georgi! Doesn’t Premier Khrushchev realize the president’s position? Doesn’t the premier know that the president has enemies as well as friends? Believe me, my brother really means what he says about American-Soviet relations. But every step he takes to meet Premier Khrushchev halfway costs my brother a lot of effort. If the premier just took the trouble to be, for a moment at least, in the president’s shoes, he would understand him. In a gust of blind hate, his enemies may go to any length, including killing him…^[7]

Bolshakov later recalled, QUOTE “I had never seen Robert so open and frank before. I had the impression he told me what the president had left unstated.”^[8] What RFK told Bolshakov is also consistent with what Soviet Spokesman Mikhail Kharlamov said President Kennedy told him during a meeting at the White House on June 26, 1961. After Kharlamov asked Kennedy why he wasn’t moving faster on advancing Soviet relations if it was really something he wanted to do. Kennedy responded, QUOTE “You don’t understand this country. If I move too fast on U.S. Soviet relations, I’ll either be thrown into an insane asylum or be killed.”^[9]

US Suspicions Begin

In August of 1962, American intelligence noticed an increased buildup of Soviet military equipment going to Cuba. National security officials concluded that the Soviets were installing defensive anti-aircraft missiles with a 30-mile range.^[10] On September 19 the CIA said it did not believe there were nuclear warheads in Cuba because QUOTE “It would be incompatible with Soviet practice to date and with Soviet policy as we presently estimate it. It would indicate a far greater willingness to increase the level of risk in U.S.-Soviet relations than the USSR had displayed thus far.”^[11]

On October 1^st, the Defense Intelligence Agency learned about a truck convoy of 20 objects that were 65 to 70 feet long and resembled large missiles. But, because there were earlier reports of a similar nature that were determined to be false, this sighting was only marked as “potentially significant.”^[12]

On October 9^th, President Kennedy approved a U2 mission over Cuba as soon as there was clear visibility, which didn’t happen until October 14^th. That U2 mission took 928 photographs and provided conclusive evidence that 3 medium-range ballistic missile sites were under construction. The cameras also picked up 21 crated medium range bombers that could deliver a nuclear strike.^[13]

Escalation

At 8:45 am on October 16^th, National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, let President Kennedy know the bad news about the findings from the U2 flight the day before.^[14] This marked the start of the thirteen day period that would come to be known as the Cuban Missile Crisis.

That morning, at the Executive Committee meeting of the National Security Council, also known as ExComm, the focus was on eliminating the Soviet missiles from Cuba. The options being discussed were either a QUOTE “sudden unannounced strike of some sort” or building up the crisis through a political track QUOTE “to the point where the other side has to consider very seriously about giving in.” The military choices were an airstrike against the missile installations, a large attack against many targets, a blockade, or an invasion.^[15]

At the October 18th EXCOMM meeting, it became clear that there were now 5 missile sites, with more intermediate range launching pads under construction. CIA director, John McCone, reported that the Soviets could have 16 to 32 missiles ready to fire within about a week. The presence of these additional missile sites led the Joint Chiefs to urge a full-scale invasion. Kennedy steadfastly resisted the idea of an invasion, and thought it was the worst possible option.^[16]

Later that day, President Kennedy kept his pre-scheduled meeting with Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko, where Gromyko lied to his face and said that the missile sites in Cuba were being set up exclusively for defensive weapons. JFK considered pulling out the photographic evidence he had in his desk drawer to confront Gromyko, but he decided against showing his cards.^[17] Even Kennedy friend, Georgi Bolshakov, couldn’t be trusted during the Missile Crisis. Khruschev had given Bolshakov false information on purpose, unbeknownst to Bolshakov, which he passed on to the White House.^[18]

After a late-night ExComm meeting, on the evening of Thursday, the 18^th, Kennedy said QUOTE “Somehow, we’ve got to take action. The question really is…what action we take which lessens the chances of a nuclear exchange, which obviously is the final failure.” He ultimately decided to resolve the crisis with a limited blockade, which he called a quarantine.^[19]

Quarantine Decision

On Friday, October 19^th, before he left the White House for a scheduled campaign event in Cleveland, Kennedy held a 45 minute morning meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Joint Chiefs were unanimously in favor of a massive air strike on Cuba, with half of them also favoring following it up with a land invasion. When Kennedy pushed back that America would risk losing West Berlin if they attack Cuba, Joint Chiefs Chairman, Maxwell Taylor, acknowledged the dilemma, but said QUOTE “if we don’t respond here in Cuba, we think American credibility is sacrificed.”^[20]

General Curtis LeMay then chimed in QUOTE “I see no other political solution than the preemptive bombing of missile sites and invasion of Cuba. This blockade and political action this is almost as bad as the appeasement at Munich.” When Kennedy emphasized that the Soviets would not just accept an American attack and there would be a counter-response, this is how LeMay responded:  

LeMay: “I think that a Blockade and political talk would be considered by a lot of our friends and neutrals as being a pretty weak response to this. And, I’m sure a lot of our own citizens feel that way too. In other words, you’re in a pretty bad fix, Mr. President.

Kennedy: What did you say?

LeMay: You’re in a pretty bad fix.

Kennedy: You’re in there with me, personally.^[21]

If you couldn’t catch that on the audio recording, LeMay tells the President he is in a pretty bad fix. JFK, says “You’re right in there with me, personally.” After the Joint Chiefs meeting, Kennedy told his friend and advisor, Kenny O’Donnell, QUOTE "These brass hats have one great advantage in their favor. If we listen to them and do what they want us to do, none of us will be alive later to tell them that they were wrong."^[22]

After JFK left for Cleveland, the ExComm met once again on Friday, the 19^th, without the president. During that meeting, there was broad agreement that the president’s blockade idea was not the best course of action. This included General Taylor and all of the Joint Chiefs, National Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, Treasury Secretary, Douglas Dillon, and CIA Director, John McCone. Only Defense Secretary, Robert McNamara, sided with Kennedy about the blockade.^[23] After a nearly 3 hour meeting the next day, the President decided to go with the blockade, against the advice of the ExComm.^[24]

Full Blown Crisis

The public facing part of the Cuban Missile Crisis kicked off on Monday, October 22^nd, after President Kennedy gave a televised speech to the nation. Earlier in the day, when he met with Congressional leaders to preview the speech, the general feeling was that the blockade was seen as a weak response.^[25]

Kennedy sent a letter to Khrushchev via Ambassador Dobrynin one hour before his speech, warning him to remove the missile bases. Khruschev responded that the US was manufacturing a crisis as a pretext to invading Cuba.^[26] But, the crisis was a real one for the President. When he gave his speech that Monday night, he told the world that Moscow created nuclear strike capability in Cuba that could hit many American cities, especially in the Southeast. Here’s the end of Kennedy’s famous Cuban Missile Crisis speech:

My fellow citizens: let no one doubt that this is a difficult and dangerous effort on which we have set out. No one can foresee precisely what course it will take or what costs or casualties will be incurred. Many months of sacrifice and self-discipline lie ahead - months in which both our patience and our will be tested - months in which many threats and denunciations will keep us aware of our dangers. But the greatest danger of all would be to do nothing.

The path we have chosen for the present is full of hazards, as all paths are - but it is the one most consistent with our character and courage as a nation and our commitments around the world. The cost of freedom is always high - but Americans have always paid it. And one path we shall never choose, and that is the path of surrender or submission.

Our goal is not the victory of might, but the vindication of right-not peace at the expense of freedom, but both peace and freedom, here in this hemisphere, and, we hope, around the world. God willing, that goal will be achieved.

Thank you and good night.^[27]

After hearing Kennedy’s speech, Khruschev responded that a quarantine, or limited blockade, would be a QUOTE “gross violation of international norms.” Kennedy argued that the Soviets started it by putting secret offensive weapons on Cuba. He then asked Khrushchev to QUOTE “show prudence and do nothing … to make the situation more difficult to control.” Attorney General Robert Kennedy told journalists Frank Holeman and Charles Bartlett to tell Georgi Bolshakov that the White House might be open to dismantling Jupiter missiles in Turkey if the Soviets removed the missiles in Cuba – but only after the Soviets already acted and QUOTE “in a time of quiet and not when there is the threat of war.” When Bobby told the same thing to Ambassador Dobrynin, Dobrynin said that the Soviet ships were still coming and the threat of a blockade would not stop them.^[28]

Quarantine Tested  

Around noon on Wednesday, October 24^th, the American blockade was tested, in a conflict that brought the cold war nuclear powers face to face, once again. At that time, two Soviet ships and one submarine were in transit to Cuba. At the last minute, Khruschev ordered the ships to turn around. Some of the generals and ExComm members suggested attacking the submarine because it did not appear to be turning around. It was later determined that the sub they considered attacking was armed with a nuclear warhead as powerful as the Hiroshima bomb.^[29]

The retreat of the Soviet ships should have been a cause for celebration in the White House, but President Kennedy, knowing the proclivities of the Joint Chiefs, was worried that the Navy would not follow his directions and would sink a Soviet ship anyway, even if it turned around. To address this concern, Secretary McNamara went to see Navy Admiral George Anderson, the man in charge of implementing the blockade, shortly after the Soviets turned away from the Quarantine line. McNamara wanted to confirm and reiterate the rules of engagement. Admiral Anderson responded that his local commanders would decide what to do. He then said, QUOTE, “Now, Mr. Secretary, if you and your deputy will go back to your offices, the Navy will run the blockade.” This incident led to Secretary McNamara forcing Admiral Anderson’s retirement in August of 1963.^[30]

We now know just how close the provocative actions of the US Navy were to setting off a nuclear war. The Navy dropped depth charge simulators near the Soviet nuclear submarine that was approaching the quarantine line. The Soviets thought the depth charges were the beginning of a war. Two of the three officers required to approve a nuclear strike from the submarine were convinced that they needed to fire. The resolute resistance of the third officer, Vice Admiral Vasili Arkhipov, in hindsight, played a huge role in avoiding a potentially apocalyptic confrontation.^[31]

Of course, the Soviet ships turning around did not mean that the crisis was over. After all, 42 of the 60 ballistic missiles that had been planned for Cuba, and all of the nuclear warheads, had already arrived before the blockade was implemented.^[32] On the evening of the 24^th, Kennedy read an angry letter from Khruschev about QUOTE “the folly of degenerate imperialism”. Khruschev also had a three hour talk with American businessman William Knox, the head of manufacturing titan, Westinghouse International, who was in Moscow for business. Khruschev told Knox that he was not interested in the destruction of the world, but QUOTE “if we all wanted to meet in Hell, it was up to us.”^[33]

BLACK SATURDAY

While the Soviets avoided a military escalation by turning around from the blockade line, the Cuban Missile Crisis was far from over. Events that transpired on Saturday, October 27^th, came very close to setting off a larger, and more deadly conflict. Still, the day began on a positive note, with a new letter from Khruschev saying he would withdraw weapons from Cuba if the U.S. removed its rockets from Turkey.^[34] Despite this apparent progress, two incidents on Black Saturday, as it would come to be known, threatened to stifle any hopes of peace.

A routine U-2 flight was scheduled that day to collect air samples near the sites of Soviet Nuclear tests. The pilot, Charles Maultsby, lost his bearings in the Northern Lights and went 1,000 miles off-course into Soviet airspace, headed directly towards a Soviet air base. When Maultsby regained his direction and returned to Alaska, there were six Russian jets chasing the plane before Maultsby could escape them by ascending to above 60,000 feet – where the Soviets couldn’t go. When the president heard about this he said QUOTE “There is always some son of a bitch who doesn’t get the word.”^[35]

Aside from Maultsby’s close call, there was a much more serious development on Black Saturday. Major Rudolph Anderson, Jr.’s U-2 was shot down during a flight over Cuba, killing Major Anderson. Two Soviet officers gave the order to fire without Moscow’s permission. Khrushchev would later tell his son Sergei that Anderson’s death was the moment when he QUOTE “felt instinctively that the missiles had to be removed – that disaster loomed. Real disaster.”^[36]

The Anderson incident almost forced Kennedy’s hand. In an ExComm meeting earlier that week, the President had already committed to bombing a Soviet surface-to-air missile base in Cuba, if an American U-2 was shot down – which is exactly what happened. Because of the prior approval, a Department of Defense contingency plan was already in motion and the Joint Chiefs began to execute that plan as quickly as possible.^[37] As American bombers were preparing their assault on Soviet missile bases in Cuba, Curtis LeMay received an urgent call. The White House was ordering him to stop the mission. When LeMay hung up, he said QUOTE “He chickened out again. How in the hell do you get men to risk their lives when the [Surface to Air Missile Sites] are not attacked?” When an aide told him LeMay he would wait by the phone for the president’s order, LeMay said QUOTE “It will never come.”^[38]

Crisis Averted

As of Saturday afternoon, the Joint Chiefs continued to urge President Kennedy to conduct a massive air strike by no later than Monday morning, followed by a ground invasion a week later.^[39] Kennedy continued to resist because he worried about losing Berlin and the conflict going nuclear. He brought in his brother to send a sensitive message to Khrushchev, this time through Ambassador Dobrynin.

Bobby told Dobrynin that QUOTE “while there could be no deal over the Turkish missiles, the President was determined to get them out and would do so once the Cuban crisis was resolved.” But, if the Soviets revealed this pledge, the offer would become null and void.^[40] RFK then told Dobrynin QUOTE:

The President is in a grave situation and he does not know how to get out of it. We are under very severe stress. In fact we are under pressure from our military to use force against Cuba. We want to ask you, Mr. Dobrynin, to pass President Kennedy’s message to Chairman Khruschev through unofficial channels…Even though the President himself is very much against starting a war over Cuba, an irreversible chain of events could occur against his will. That is why the President is appealing directly to Chairman Khruschev for help in liquidating this conflict. If the situation continues much longer, the President is not sure that the military will not overthrow him and seize power.^[41]

Not long after RFK spoke to Dobrynin, Khrushchev was urging the need for a retreat in order to save the Soviet Union from an American nuclear strike. He had just received a message from Fidel Castro that a U.S. attack on Cuba was QUOTE “almost imminent.”^[42] During the meeting, Dobrynin’s report arrived about his meeting with Bobby Kennedy, re-emphasizing the urgency to end the crisis. Khrushchev then dictated a letter accepting Kennedy’s terms and broadcast it on Soviet Radio, which was heard in Washington on Sunday morning, October 28^th, around 9am.^[43]  

Joint Chiefs Not Impressed

Upon hearing Khrushchev’s acceptance of terms on the radio, most people in the White House celebrated. The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, wrote a letter to the President recommending executing the air strikes that had been planned for Monday morning anyway, unless there was irrefutable evidence that the Soviets were actually removing the missile sites.

Once the predicament in Cuba was over, JFK instructed that no statements be made or interviews given that QUOTE “would claim any kind of victory. If it was a triumph, it was a triumph for the next generation and not for any particular government or people.”^[44] Kennedy’s handling of the Crisis enraged the same people in the US who were upset about his handling of the Bay of Pigs.^[45] For example, when Kennedy met with the Joint Chiefs to thank them  for their efforts, Navy Admiral Anderson said QUOTE “We have been had!” Air Force Chief of Staff, General Curtis LeMay called the settlement QUOTE “the greatest defeat in our history” and, once again, urged a prompt invasion of Cuba. According to Secretary McNamara, the President was QUOTE “absolutely shocked” and “stuttering in reply.”^[46]

After the meeting, JFK told his aide, Arthur Schlesinger, QUOTE “The military are mad. They wanted to do this.”^[47]

NEXT TIME ON SOLVING JFK: We analyze Cold War spy games to see what we can learn about the JFK Assassination from Popov’s Mole and from Soviet Defector, Yuri Nosenko.

^[1] Robert Dallek, An Unfinished Life: John F. Kennedy, 1917-1963, at 535.

^[2] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cuban_Missile_Crisis

^[3] James W. Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 495-497. (The code name was Operation ANADYR — many soldiers thought they were going to the Soviet Far East and were outfitted with skis, boots, and parkas.)

^[4] Dallek, at 537.

^[5] Id., at 538.

^[6] Georgi Bolshakov, The Hot Line, No 5, 40 (Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable at 501)

^[7] James W. Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 502.

^[8] Douglass, Martyrs, at 502.

^[9] Id.at 503. (Kharlamov to Pierre Salinger, January 31, 1989, Pierre Salinger, P.S.: A Memoir, at 253).

^[10] Dallek, at 537.

^[11] Id., at 541.

^[12] Id., at 542-543.

^[13] Id., at 543-544.

^[14] Id., at 544.

^[15] Id., at 546-547.

^[16] Id., at 551.

^[17] Id., at 553.

^[18] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 473.

^[19] Dallek, at 554.

^[20] Id., at 554-555.

^[21] https://vimeo.com/237227767; Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 516.

^[22] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 519.

^[23] Dallek, at 555-556; Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 524-525.

^[24] Id., at 556.

^[25] Id., at 557.

^[26] Id., at 559.

^[27] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M8ZFh39TWRk, at 16:22; https://loveman.sdsu.edu/docs/1962Kennedy_missilecrisisspeech.pdf

^[28] Dallek, at 560-561.

^[29] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 530.

^[30] Dallek, at 562; https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/George_Whelan_Anderson_Jr. 

^[31] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vasily_Arkhipov

^[32] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 529.

^[33] Dallek, at 563.

^[34] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 535.

^[35] Id., at 536.

^[36] Id., at 538.

^[37] Id., at 538-540.

^[38] Id., at 540.

^[39] Dallek, at 567.

^[40] Id., at 569.

^[41] James W. Douglass, JFK & the Unspeakable at 27.

^[42] Id., at 28.

^[43] Dallek, at 570.

^[44] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 551.

^[45] John Newman, Into the Storm, at 119.

^[46] Dallek, at 570-571

^[47] Douglass, Martyrs to the Unspeakable, at 549, note 298.